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Abstract 
 
In this paper I show how the accepted notion that discourse analytic findings must 
compromise generalizability in order to gain a detailed understanding of the area 
being investigated is not the case. Instead, I show how such findings can be 
considered generalizable to the extent that they can show how a particular discursive 
strategy will often bring about the same international results. This means that 
discourse analysts can, and arguably should, claim that a discursive strategy that they 
have identified will accomplish similar rhetorical effects in a variety of interactions. I 
use existing conversation analytic and discursive finding and examples from my own 
data where (i) an ‘us and them’ distinction is used to argue against immigration and 
asylum and (ii) where existing prejudice is used to justify further prejudice, to 
illustrate the generalizability of such findings. I conclude by discussing the extent to 
which generalizations are possible and the implications of being able to make claims 
generalizability for the discipline. 
 
Key words: Discursive Psychology, Generalizability, Qualitative Methodology, Us 
and Them, Asylum Seekers 
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1. Introduction 
The Qualitative/Quantitative distinction is one of the most well rehearsed in 
Psychological and Social research (e.g. Bryman, 1988; Creswell, 2003; Flick, 2006; 
Punch, 2005). The accepted wisdom is that quantitative research offers reliable results 
from a representative sample of participants that the researchers can apply to a wider 
population – that is, they are generalizable (e.g. Popper, 1959). So, for example, 
Laythe, Finkel and Kirkpatrick (2001) applied the Right Wing Authoritarian attitude 
scale to 138 participants and concluded that people who are Right Wing 
Authoritarians are the most likely to hold prejudiced views. By contrast, qualitative 
researchers tend to accept that their findings cannot be generalized in this way; 
instead generalizability is sacrificed in favour of a more detailed understanding of the 
issue being researched (see, for example, Wetherell, Taylor and Yates, 2001). 
 
Discourse analysts have been critical of quantitative methods (e.g. Billig, 2002; 
Condor, 2006; Figgou and Condor, 2006) by claiming that these findings’ lack of 
meaning makes their generalizability irrelevant and that the generalizable results are 
in fact produced, rather than identified, by the research (Billig, et al., 1988; Edwards, 
1997; Potter, 1998; Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Speer and Potter, 2000). Nevertheless, 
quantitative researchers continue working with the assumption that their work is 
generalizable, while discourse analysts continue their research agendas without 
making any such claims, as for example, Schofield shows that ‘there is broad 
agreement that generalizability in the sense of producing laws that apply universally is 
not a useful standard or goal for qualitative research’ (1993: 207, see also Stroh, 
2000). In this paper, however, I am going to show that discourse analytic findings can, 
to an extent, be generalized. 
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2. Beginning to generalize. 
 
It has been suggested that if language is analysed as a system, then this system can be 
seen as generalizable (Taylor, 2001). This is certainly true of the Conversation 
Analytic research that much discourse analysis is based on. For example Schegloff’s 
work on the sequences of conversations is a convincing analysis of the consistent – 
and therefore generalizable – rules of conversation (Schegloff 1968, 1979, Schegloff, 
Jefferson & Sacks 1977). So for example Schegloff refers to the ‘distribution rule’ 
(1968: 1076) of telephone conversations; that it, the answerer speaks first. He also 
shows that ‘demonstrations of continued, coordinated hearership’ ‘such as “uh huh” 
and “mmhmm”’ (1968: 1093) can be made while another speaker is talking without 
being taken as an interruption that speaker. Forty years on, these rules still hold firm, 
and have even been applied to Japanese conversations (see Mori, 2006).  Atkinson 
(1984) has shown the patterns of speech that are successful in invoking applause in 
the setting of public speaking, showing for example that applause often follows after a 
speaker ‘criticizes or insults the opposition, praises or boasts about his or her own 
position, or does both at once’ (1984: 377, emphasis in original). In their analysis of 
television news interviews Clayman and Heritage show how different types of 
interview questions invite different responses, while different types of question 
formulation are responded to as more or less confrontational. For example, negative 
questions, such as ‘didn’t you X’ are shown to invite a yes response, and a question 
using the ‘“How could you X” format is clearly confrontational’ (2002: 221). Perhaps 
the best known example of a generalizable conversational strategy is that of the three-
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part list (Jefferson, 1990) where lists are consistently seen to include three items to 
show that the list is complete, and that what is been described is normative. 
 
While it can therefore be seen that specific sequential organisations, and certain types 
of question formulation can be seen to be generalizable, discourse analysts are 
concerned not just with sequential organisation, but also with the ‘action orientation’ 
of talk (e.g. Billig and MacMillan, 2005; Edwards and Potter, 1992). It is at this point 
that discursive research may appear difficult or impossible to generalize; even Taylor, 
who argues that it may be possible to generalize the function of talk, argues that to do 
so would require collecting a very large corpus of data on a subject which could 
require electronic sorting and potentially even some quantitative analysis (2001: 13). 
In the following analysis I am going to show how it is not necessary to collect an 
unmanageable data corpus, or to resort to quantitative analysis to show how discourse 
analytic findings can be generalizable. In the following section I will show how one 
rhetorical devise – the ‘us and them’ dichotomy – can be seen to occur in a number of 
contexts in the service of opposing asylum and immigration. 
 
3. The Generalizability of the Us and Them Distinction  
 
The ‘Us and Them’ distinction is a commonly used rhetorical strategy to make a 
native group and a group of incomers appear to be very different to the extent that 
they do not belong together. Furthermore it constructs the incoming group as 
distinctively not us, by working up the differences between two groups and 
importantly the ‘them’ group is positioned as not worthy of the ‘us’ groups’ sympathy 
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or help. The following extract comes from Verkuyten’s study of how Dutch natives 
talk about ethnic minorities in the Netherlands. 
 
Extract One1 (Verkyuten, 2001: 263, listed as extract two) 
1. ‘Yeah, whether you’re white, black, yellow, or purple, I don’t give a damn. 
2. As long as you’re behaving just normally and running the home just normally, 
3. your kids, and you don’t have to do anything special, just keep clean and live 
4. properly, and how you live is up to you, but just don’t bother the 
5. neighbours.’ 
 
Verkyuten states that this participant (like others in his study) ‘make a clear 
distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ whereby a description of the kind of things that 
‘we’ would typically say or do is contrasted with what ‘they’ do. So the typical and 
common behaviour of the Dutch provides the norm in terms of which ‘their’ 
behaviour is evaluated and defined as abnormal’ (2001: 263). We see that in the 
Dutch context, ethnic minorities are discursively separated from the ‘natives’ in a way 
that highlights the differences between the two groups, here in the service of 
justifying the exclusion of ethnic minorities from housing. In a study of Parliamentary 
discourse about immigration in France Van der Valk shows how the French natives – 
‘us’ – are presented positively, while the immigrants – ‘them’ – are presented in 
negative terms. From these examples we can see that this ‘us and them’ dichotomy is 
used in justifying opposition to immigration. In the next section we begin to see how 
the same strategy is used in opposing asylum too. 
 
                                                        
1 Please note that all data extracts are repeated from the original source and are transcribed according to 
the authors’ own conventions. See the originals for these details and the full analyses.  
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The following extract is from Lynn and Lea’s study of letters in newspapers referring 
to asylum seeking in the UK. 
 
Extract Two (Lynn and Lea, 2003: 441, listed as extract eight) 
The human rights issue crops up constantly in reference to asylum seekers, but what 
about the rights of us Britons? 
(Daily Mail, 2 April 2001) 
 
Here they show that ‘us Britons’ are referred to in explicit contrast to ‘asylum 
seekers’ to suggest that these asylum seekers are a ‘threat to British people’ (2003: 
441) and in doing so the (human) rights of asylum seekers are criticised and their 
exclusion is justified. I have also found this ‘us and them’ strategy being used in my 
own research about asylum seeking in the UK. In the following extracts we see two 
different illustrations of the way in which the ‘us and them’ dichotomy is used to 
justify the exclusion of asylum seeking. These illustrations both utilise the same 
strategy, to the same end, but here in very different contexts. First we see a television 
presenter and then a member of the public employing the strategy. 
 
Extract Three (Goodman and Speer, 2007: 172, listed as extract four) 
1. Murnaghan: OK well let’s just er pursue this issue of language er Oliver 
2.   Letwin in Westminster there would you er go along with er 
3.   Peter Hitchens and say that we really should be calling many 
4.   of the people who are trying to get into our country .and who 
5.  are coming into our country are, .hhh illegal (.) economic 
6.   migrants (.) they’re not asylum seekers 
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(Asylum: Face the Nation. BBC1, 23 July, 2003) 
 
Extract Four (Goodman, 2007: 41, section from extract eight) 
1. This country cannot afford people with this mentality that the you can  
2. have as many children as you like here & the state will pay for their 
3. upkeep. Is it any wonder our pension funds are in such dire straights 
4. when this kind of behaviour is going on all over the country with 
5. illegal immigrants who have never paid a penny into the state coffers in 
6. national insurance or income tax. 
(Henry Piggot-Smythe, Prestbury, Cheshire 25/08/2005 at 11:142) 
 
While the question made by Murnaghan (extract three) does not directly justify the 
exclusion of asylum seekers (presented here as, at least, potential economic migrants) 
constructing these incomers as ‘not us’ positions them as people who do not need to 
be afforded the same rights and privileges as the British us; it is not surprising then 
that Letwin (the politician invited to speak in line three) goes on to make an argument 
that justifies policies that would restrict the right of asylum into the UK. Similarly the 
comments made by Piggot-Smythe (extract four) refers to ‘this country’ (line one) and 
‘our pension funds’ (line three, my emphasis) in contrast to ‘people with this 
mentality’ (line one) and ‘illegal immigrants’ (line five). This constructs a British ‘us’ 
made up of people who contribute to the state, in opposition to the illegal immigrant 
‘them’ who go to Britain to live off the hard work of the ‘us’. 
 
                                                        
2 This internet debate took place on the Manchester Evening News website which can be viewed at the 
following address: 
http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/c/171031_do_your_own_dirty_work.html 
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With this ‘us and them’ dichotomy being used to argue against the rights of 
immigrants and asylum seekers, it follows that people who support these people will 
work to undermine and challenge such a distinction. An example of such a challenge 
can be seen in the following example taken from the same debate as the previous 
extract. 
 
Extract Five: (Goodman, 2007: 38, extract one) 
1.   Of course the councils are correct in refusing to act inhumanely. I don't  
2.    want to live in a country that separates kids from their mums, and  
3.    chucks them out of the country purely because we resent sharing our  
4.  riches. …. Those who would split this family should be ashamed.  
5.  You'd rather hurt kids than admit your politics can be flawed. 
6.   Disgusting.  
(James, Eccles 24/08/2005 at 12:21) 
 
Here we see a reclassifying of the us and them distinction so that instead of the 
us/them being British/incomer it becomes pro-family/anti-family; in this way the 
dichotomy is not based on nationality but on morality. This type of classification 
allows asylum seekers to be included in the ‘us’ which means that any differences 
between British people and asylum seekers are not worked up, but are nullified by the 
reference to the similarities between the two groups. Instead, it is opponents of 
asylum seeking who become ‘them’ (or ‘those’ line four). 
 
What is interesting about this extract is that the ‘us and them’ distinction identified in 
the previous extracts is identifiable here (‘our riches’ lines three to four and ‘them’ 
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line three). Where this extract differs is that the contributor plays down the distinction 
in favour of a moral distinction in an attempt to rhetorically undermine this pervasive 
distinction. This suggests that James is attentive to the discursive strategy of 
distinguishing ‘us and them’ in the service opposing asylum and is explicitly 
organising his text both because of this, and to work again it. This shows that not only 
is the ‘us and them’ distinction generalizable to the extent that it is often used by 
opponents of asylum seekers to justify their exclusion, but that supporters of asylum 
are attentive to this and attempt to reclassify the dichotomy along different lines to 
construct a more inclusive approach to asylum seekers.   
 
I have now demonstrated how it can be claimed that, in general, opponents of asylum 
seeking and immigration utilise an ‘us and them’ distinction in providing grounds for 
their exclusion. Leudar et al (2004) have shown us, however, that an ‘us and them’ 
distinction is not just used in opposing asylum and immigration. They show us how 
an ‘us and them’ distinction was used by the American President George Bush 
directly following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York.  
 
Extract Six: (Leudar et al., 2004: 248, listed as extract five) 
28 The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the  
29 full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those 
30 responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the 
31 terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them. 
(Bush statement 11/9/01) 
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Here ‘us’ refers to the entire nation of America while ‘them’ are ‘those who are 
behind these evil acts’ (line 28) and ‘those who harbour them’ (line 31). While the ‘us 
and them’ distinction identified in the previous extracts refers to the natives and the 
incomers to the country in question and is used to justify the exclusion of, and harsh 
measures towards, asylum seekers and immigrants, the ‘us and them’ distinction as 
used by Bush is designed for a different purpose altogether. Here, Bush is beginning 
to make a case for taking action following the attacks on New York and in particular 
is preparing the rhetorical groundwork necessary for justifying the military action that 
would take place in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. 
 
At first glance such a seemingly different use of an ‘us and them’ distinction would 
appear to weaken the case for the generalizability of the strategy because a similar 
strategy is being used to very different ends. However, in both uses of the ‘us and 
them’ dichotomy very similar rhetorical ends are being accomplished. Both uses work 
to construct the ‘us’ group (be that as the ‘native’ population or the American 
nation/Victim of terrorism) and in both cases this distinction is used to justify the ends 
of the ‘us’ group at the expense of ‘them’. This suggests that the usage of the ‘us and 
them’ strategy is consistently (generalizably) used to the detriment of those included 
in the ‘them’ category. What this tells us about the generalizability of discursive 
findings is that while these findings are generalizable, the analyst must be specific in 
to what extent this is so. 
 
It would be a mistake, for example, to claim that the ‘us and them’ distinction is 
always used to oppose immigration when clearly it can be used for much more. A 
more reasonable claim would be that ‘us and them distinctions are used to justify 
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(negative) action against the ‘them’ group; when it is used in the asylum debate, for 
example, it will be used to ‘other’ asylum seekers and so provide the justification for 
their exclusion however when it is used in talk about terrorism it will be utilised for 
justifying (contentious) action against terrorists and those considered to be aiding 
them’. I have no doubt the use of an ‘us and them’ distinction in other areas of debate 
will be used to consolidate the ‘us’ group and to justify some negative action against 
the ‘them’ group. 
 
I will now show that the generalizability of a discursive strategy is not limited to the 
‘us and them’ distinction by showing how the strategy of justifying prejudice on the 
grounds of existing prejudice is another generalizable strategy. 
 
4. The Generalizability of using existing Prejudice to Justify further Prejudice. 
 
The previous section focused on the way in which one discursive strategy can be seen 
to be used in the opposition to asylum seeking. In this section I will show how a 
broader strategy can be seen to be used generally in seemingly different areas; namely 
opposing Lesbian/Gay parenting, opposing the rights of asylum seekers to in the UK 
and doing hostility towards immigrants in Greece. This strategy involves members 
drawing upon existing prejudice in the service of justifying further prejudice.  
 
Clarke (2001, see also Clarke, Kiztinger and Potter, 2004) showed how Lesbian and 
Gay parents are made accountable for the homophobic bullying that their children 
may suffer. Furthermore, they show that this bullying may be used to argue against 
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the existence of such families. Here we see this argument being used in a television 
programme about lesbian/gay adoption. 
 
Extract Seven: (Clarke, 2001: 565-566) 
I really have quite strong feelings about the inappropriateness of lesbian and 
homosexual partners adopting children . . . If you think of a child in school, we know 
that other children can be cruel and may say to another child, “There’s something 
different about you, you’ve got two mummies,” or “You’ve got two daddies” . . . I 
think we’re adding to the complexity of children’s situations, and that really concerns 
me. 
(Catherine MacAskil, lecturer in adoption and fostering, Heart of the Matter, February 
1993: “Fostering prejudice”) 
 
Clarke cites a number of examples of such an argument from a range of television 
debate programmes (2001: 566). Here we see how the existing prejudice (that 
homosexuals and even their children are bullied) is used to justify more prejudice 
(lesbian/gay parenting should not be allowed). This rhetorical strategy is a useful one 
for a speaker because it presents the her/him as someone who is caring and is actively 
involved in opposing prejudice (i.e. defending the children from bullying) instead of 
being someone who reverts to a circular argument of ‘blaming the victim’ (Clarke, 
2001: 566). 
 
Clarke’s studies (Clarke, 2001; Clarke, Kiztinger and Potter, 2004) show us that this 
strategy of using existing homophobia to justify the (homophobic) opposition to 
lesbian/gay parenting is not unique to these findings: Ellis (2001), Falk (1989), Mohr 
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(1988) and Raymond (1992) and Tasker and Golombok (1997) have all shown how 
homophobic bullying is used as the rhetorical justification for further homophobic 
practice. 
 
Moving away from the area of homophobia we can see that the discursive strategy of 
using existing prejudice to justify further prejudice is also in use within the asylum 
debate. As the following extracts from my own research show, the existence of the 
(arguably) prejudicial British National Party (often referred to as ‘extremists’) is often 
used by other opponents of asylum seeking to argue for a more harsh approach to 
asylum seekers to be taken. 
 
Extract Eight: (Goodman, in press, listed as extract four) 
BBC 1 o’clock News – Howard Immigration speech 24/01/2005 
1. Sanford the chairman of the anti  
2.    immigration organisation migration (.) watch toured the studios 
3.    this morning (.) welcoming Conservative proposals to reduce  
4.    those figures (.) sharply  
5. Green eighty percent of the population want to see much tougher 
6.    immigration control:s (.) including very importantly .hhh 
7.    fifty two percent .hhh of the ethnic minority communities (.) 
8.    when public er feeling is that stro:ng (.) the main political 
9.    parties must respond to it (.) or they leave the field wide 
10.    open to the extremists 
 
Extract Nine: (Goodman, in press, listed as extract seven) 
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Asylum: Face the Nation. BBC1. 23/07/03 
1. Ommar and Rich Salanky erm er points out that erm as some one 
2.    of the er from the ethnic minorities he’s worried about how (.) a 
3.    liberal (.) asylum policy could be (.) could be er exploited he  
4.    says “why do so many people seek asylum in the UK? It’s 
5.    because we’re a soft touch and it will play into the hand of the 
6.    British National Party”  
 
In extract eight we see Sir Andrew Green, the head of the anti-immigration 
organisation ‘Migration Watch’, respond to a news interviewer Stanford about a plan 
to reduce the levels of immigration and asylum to the UK by claming that it is 
important to have much tougher immigration controls. In extract nine we see a very 
similar argument made by a caller to a televised debate programme. Both of these 
contributions follow the same simple structure: There is opposition to the ‘soft’ 
approach to allowing asylum seekers/immigrants into the UK therefore it must be 
‘toughened up’ to prevent extremists from coming to power. 
 
These members do not draw upon the parallels between the policies they are 
proposing and those of the ‘extremists’ that they claim to be opposing as this could 
alert the listener to the circular nature of the argument. As with the homophobic 
arguments above, these arguments rely on existing prejudice (in this case the 
existence of extremist political parties like the British National Party) to justify the 
further prejudice (in this case policies that exclude asylum seekers). Notice also how 
the strategy I have called ‘invoking ethnic minorities’ (e.g. Goodman, in press) where 
people either claim to have support of ethnic minorities (as Green does in extract 
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eight) or of making salient the speaker’s own ethnic minority status (as is the case in 
extract nine). This strategy helps to inoculate the speaker against accusations of 
prejudice or to present the speaker as someone more likely to be a victim than a 
perpetrator of prejudice. This functions to distance the speaker from the prejudicial 
nature of the talk and may be another example of a generalizable discursive strategy.  
 
I have now shown how existing prejudice is used to justify further prejudice in both 
opposition to homosexual parenting and to asylum seeking. In this next extract from 
Figgou and Condor’s (2006) study of lay representations of prejudice in Greece, we 
see an example of how prejudice towards immigrant Albanians is justified on the 
grounds of a prejudicial argument that the speaker explicitly accepts as, at least 
potentially, inaccurate. 
 
Extract Ten: (Figgou and Condor, 2006: 236, listed as extract nine)  
1   Ilektra:  I have the feeling however that our racism is less organized [compared to 
2     that in Germany] (.) I have in mind for example the racist organizations 
3     against the Turks (.) against the foreigners in Germany (.) still things are 
4     different here 
5  Lia:    I see (.) hmm (.) during the last year however (.) I’m not sure if this is the 
6      case (1.5) I heard for example about this association of people who have 
7     been robbed by Albanians (.) I think they were on the telly last week 
8  Ilektra:  Yes (.) they have elected a president [laughs] I heard about it (.) It’s quite 
9      extreme (.) indeed (.) you know what I’m thinking though (1.5) some 
10    people in remote villages may feel threatened (.) they may have to live 
11    with this feeling of lack of safety that you and I don’t have to face (.) I’m 
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12    not sure (.) but I feel that I don’t know what I would do if I had to live 
13    under these conditions 
14 Lia:   So you say that some people are reacting because they are in danger?   
15    They live under conditions of lack of safety? 
16 Ilektra:   Not necessarily (.) I mean they may just think that they are in danger (.) 
17    they may just be afraid that they are in danger (.) I’ m sure it is not true (.) 
18    not in all cases. 
 
By this point it may not be surprising to see that Figgou and Condor draw parallels 
with similar findings: ‘The use of a discourse of perceived risk to justify and 
legitimate practical measures aimed at social exclusion has been identified in other 
contexts’ (2006: 237). This perceived risk of crime, however, refers to a prejudicial 
argument based upon the criminal nature of Albanians – a position that Ilektra does 
not even accept to be true, even though this is used to justify the existence of a 
prejudicial organisation. This means that the existence of prejudice is used to excuse 
further prejudice. As Figgou and Condor describe it ‘the stereotype of Albanian 
criminality effectively served the social function of justifying discriminatory action’ 
(2006: 239). 
 
I have therefore demonstrated that the discursive strategy of using existing prejudice 
to justify (or excuse) further prejudice is used in a number of diverse contexts – 
opposing gay/lesbian parenting, opposing asylum seeking rights and excusing anti 
Albanian policies.  
 
5. Discussion 
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In this paper I have now presented a number of areas where discursive strategies can 
be seen to be generalizable. Beginning with conversation analytic findings I have 
shown how certain conversational structures can be seen to be generalized across 
conversational settings; Schegloff (e.g. 1968) has shown that the opening turns of 
conversations are very consistent and Atkinson (1984) has shown how certain 
conversational features are consistently present in talks that invoke applause. I have 
also shown how the rhetorical strategy of using an ‘us and them’ dichotomy helps to 
present immigrants and asylum seekers as different and therefore undeserving of ‘our’ 
sympathy. Because of the effectiveness of this strategy it can be seen to be used in a 
variety of contexts – in a range of countries and by a range of different speakers – 
always performing the same action of opposing people coming into a country. 
Therefore, I am claiming that this strategy is generalizable. The same can be seen with 
the strategy of justifying prejudice by drawing on cases of existing prejudice. In a 
variety of conversational settings about a range of different issues we can see the 
same discursive strategy being used to accomplish the same prejudicial ends. 
Together, these examples show us that discursive psychological findings can be seen 
as generalizable. 
 
The type of generalizability I am claiming exists within discursive analytic findings is 
not the same as that claimed to exist in qualitative findings, however. I am not 
claiming, for example, to be able to make predictions based upon how many people 
will use a certain strategy. Instead I am claiming that on the basis of the findings of a 
detailed analysis, such as those drawn upon in this paper, the analyst should be able to 
state that the following is true: 
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1. A discursive strategy can (and in the course of analysis should) be shown to 
achieve a certain rhetorical accomplishment (e.g. the ‘us and them’ dichotomy 
functions to present people from abroad as different and undeserving of 
sympathy). 
2. This strategy will often be used in a range of conversational settings in an attempt 
to bring about this rhetorical accomplishment (e.g. we see the ‘us and them’ 
strategy used in a number of countries by both politicians and members of the 
public). 
3. If this strategy often brings about the same accomplishment this strategy can be 
described as a successful strategy (this is true of the ‘us and them’ distinction). 
4. It can be shown that successful strategies will be used by a range of speakers in a 
range of contexts to bring about the same rhetorical end. To this extent it is 
generalizable. 
5. We may begin to see opposition to successful and generally used strategies (as 
with the attempted reclassification of the ‘us and them’ distinction in extract five). 
 
The implications for discursive psychology of claiming that its findings can be 
generalized are significant. Instead of claiming that generalizability is sacrificed in 
favour of a rich and detailed understanding of the subject being investigated, 
discursive psychologists should be able to claim both a detailed analysis and a level of 
generalizability. On the basis of this discourse analysts should, perhaps, pay more 
attention to the wider implications of what they discover and those with a more 
critical approach (e.g. Edley, 2001; Lynn and Lea, 2003) could consider developing 
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ways to challenge existing – and generalizable – damaging (and/or prejudicial) 
discursive strategies. 
 
Making a claim about the generalizability of a discursive strategy should, however, be 
done cautiously. For example, the analyst must show a strategy working in a number 
of different contexts if it is to be shown to be generalizable. This may not always be 
possible within the scope of a research project, in which case the analyst will need to 
draw upon existing research where a strategy has been used to accomplish the same 
rhetorical goal, or conduct further analysis to ascertain whether or not the strategy is 
being used in different contexts.  
 
The argumentative nature of these strategies means that their generalizability cannot 
be expected to endure over time; especially as new discursive strategies are used to 
counter existing ones. For example, the ‘taboo on prejudice’ (e.g. Augoustinos et al, 
2005; Billig, 1988) where people attempt to rhetorically distance themselves from 
being presented as racist and/or prejudice is a well documented and generalizable 
discursive pattern that has allowed accusations of racism to be a successful 
argumentative tool. However, recent discursive findings suggest that a new taboo on 
accusations of racism may be undermining this existing strategy (e.g. Every and 
Augoustinos, 2007; Goodman, forthcoming) to the extent that a once generalizable 
strategy may no longer achieve the same rhetorical ends. It is also the case that 
discursive analytical findings may not be repeatable as different analysts may make 
different findings based on the same data (as is shown in van den Berg, Wetherell, 
and Houtkoop-Steenstra’s (2003) book where different analysts addressed an existing 
corpus of data each with their own findings). Nevertheless, the point here is that all of 
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these differing findings can be seen to be generalizable as long as thorough analysis 
shows this to be the case. 
 
To conclude, where it has been widely accepted that discursive psychological findings 
are not generalizable I have shown that a discursive strategy can be generalizable to 
the extent that the ‘action’ (e.g. Edwards and Potter, 1992) that it accomplishes can be 
generalized across contexts. 
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